The Covid-19 crisis : a critical juncture for EU climate policy development? by Dupont, Claire et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=geui20
Journal of European Integration
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/geui20
The Covid-19 crisis: a critical juncture for EU
climate policy development?
Claire Dupont , Sebastian Oberthür & Ingmar von Homeyer
To cite this article: Claire Dupont , Sebastian Oberthür & Ingmar von Homeyer (2020) The
Covid-19 crisis: a critical juncture for EU climate policy development?, Journal of European
Integration, 42:8, 1095-1110, DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2020.1853117
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2020.1853117
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 29 Dec 2020.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 46
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
The Covid-19 crisis: a critical juncture for EU climate policy 
development?
Claire Duponta, Sebastian Oberthürb,c and Ingmar von Homeyerb
aDepartment of Public Governance and Management, Ghent University, Gent, Belgium; bInstitute for 
European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium; cBelgium and University of Eastern Finland, 
Joensuu, Finland
ABSTRACT
The EU has demonstrated increasing commitment to combating 
climate change. In December 2019, the European Commission 
published the European Green Deal (EGD) – an evolving, overarch-
ing strategy that aims to achieve climate neutrality by 2050. Just as 
the plans were underway to implement the EGD, the Covid-19 crisis 
hit. We ask whether it is likely that the Covid-19 crisis represents 
a critical juncture for EU climate policy, and why? Experience from 
previous economic crises suggests that climate policy may be set 
aside. In 2020, the EU’s crisis response seems rather to advance EU 
climate policy, at least on paper. Given the potential for transforma-
tional change already embedded in the EGD, we suggest that 
additional positive effects of the Covid-19 crisis may not add up 
to a critical juncture. We reflect on the role of Commission entre-
preneurship and the politicisation of climate change and climate 
policy to explain this outcome.
Introduction
Over the past decades, the EU has demonstrated increasing commitment to combating 
climate change. It has significantly advanced its domestic climate policy, most recently 
through implementing its Climate and Energy Policy Framework for 2030 (e.g. Kulovesi 
and Oberthür 2020). Both its climate mitigation targets and the related legislative acquis 
have been at the forefront internationally and have served to underpin EU international 
climate leadership. EU domestic climate policy has, however, remained insufficient for 
achieving the Paris Agreement’s temperature target of limiting the increase of global 
temperature to 1.5 or even 2 degrees Celsius. To further align EU climate policy with the 
Paris Agreement, the European Commission (hereafter: Commission) under Commission 
President Ursula von der Leyen presented the European Green Deal (EGD) as an evolving, 
overarching policy strategy in December 2019 (European Commission 2019).
Just as the Commission and other EU institutions were preparing for the implementa-
tion of the EGD, the Covid-19 crisis hit. Experience from previous economic crises, and the 
economic and financial crisis of 2008/2009 especially, suggests that climate and 
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environmental policy may be set aside or downgraded in importance (Gravey and Jordan 
2019). However, advanced knowledge about the importance of the sustainability transi-
tion and the increased political weight of climate change mean that the Covid-19 crisis 
may instead trigger a response that reinforces EU climate ambitions and drives EU climate 
policy towards transformational change.
Against this background, this article investigates the effects of the economic crisis in 
the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic (hereafter: the Covid-19 crisis) on EU climate policy. 
We ask whether the Covid-19 crisis could constitute a ‘critical juncture’ for EU climate 
policy by either profoundly undermining or strengthening/transforming EU climate pol-
icy. We investigate two driving forces to understand the effect, (1) policy entrepreneur-
ship (especially of the Commission) and (2) politicisation, and the interaction between 
them. As we are examining an unfolding empirical case, we aim for an exploratory 
analysis, opening up new avenues for detailed analysis in future, rather than attempting 
a comprehensive explanation. Methodologically, we draw on existing literature, docu-
ment analysis and media reports.
We argue that, unlike previous crises, the Covid-19 crisis and the EU’s response to it have 
so far not downgraded or side-lined climate policy. Instead, the crisis has tended to 
strengthen and reinforce the EGD, which itself may be a potentially transformational critical 
juncture of EU climate policy (although much still depends on implementation). As such, 
the Covid-19 crisis could produce positive effects on EU climate policy, but its transforma-
tional potential may be limited, since the EGD may have already triggered the transforma-
tion of EU climate policy. Whether or not the Covid-19 crisis can be considered a critical 
juncture – whether the EU’s response to Covid-19 shifts EU climate policy onto a new path – 
can therefore only be assessed with time. While potential exists, we suggest that the EGD 
represents an earlier juncture that set the new, potentially transformational, path. We find 
that two main factors allowed the window of opportunity opened by the Covid-19 crisis to 
be exploited towards an advancement of the EGD within the EU’s recovery plan: the 
entrepreneurial role of the Commission, and the political momentum created by increasing 
politicisation of climate change at all levels of governance and across EU institutions.
We pursue our argument in three main steps. First, we spell out our analytical frame-
work by introducing the notion of a critical juncture and outlining how we could identify 
a critical juncture. We also introduce the two explanatory factors in focus. Second, we 
investigate the effects of the Covid-19 crisis as a potential turning point of EU climate 
policy, with a particular emphasis on the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and 
the Next Generation EU (NextGenEU) funding programme as the core of the EU crisis 
response negotiated in 2020. This is followed, third, by an investigation of the identified 
explanatory factors, and the interactions between them. We conclude with a synthesis of 
our findings and a discussion of their implications.
Identifying and explaining a critical juncture
We focus on exploring whether the Covid-19 crisis represents a critical juncture for EU 
climate policy development, and why. In this section, we discuss how to recognise 
a critical juncture in practice, and present two main variables for explaining why the 
Covid-19 crisis may or may not potentially become a critical juncture for EU climate policy, 
drawing also from Wolff and Ladi (2020).
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What is a critical juncture?
Building on relevant literature, two key points emerge for a clearer understanding of 
what could constitute a critical juncture: (1) the temporal dimension of critical juncture 
effects; and (2) the extent of the change effected. Both elements make identifying 
whether a current phenomenon or event is a critical juncture or not methodologically 
challenging.
A critical juncture has causal effects. Critical junctures are events or choices that are 
important turning points and are a key explanation for policy or institutional change. 
Capoccia (2016) suggests that a critical juncture is synonymous with a crisis, unsettled or 
turbulent times. While institutional and policy processes are considered to be path 
dependent, i.e. locked into a certain developmental pathway, an exogenous shock, or 
crisis, may effect a shift away from the existing path dependencies. These critical junctures 
then lead to new path dependent development (Pierson 1996; Stark 2018), meaning that 
both the time and extent of the effects are key.
First, to be recognised as a critical juncture, an event must have a causal impact on 
future events (Capoccia 2016, 89). A critical juncture can only effectively be identified with 
the passing of time, when the causal effect of a particular event on future policy or 
institutional pathways materialises. This makes analysing contemporary events for their 
path-breaking effects methodologically challenging. However, we can already identify the 
potential of a certain event to change the direction of policy or institutional development 
toward new pathways or path dependencies for the future, thereby outlining how likely it 
is that an event becomes a critical juncture. This assessment is based on the initial 
decisions and policies made in response to that event rather than on their (future) 
implementation and/or subsequent decisions.
Second, the extent of change ascribed to a critical juncture may depend on the 
analytical perspective. A critical juncture that results in comprehensive institutional 
change can be considered as leading to transformation in the direction of long-term, 
overarching structures or norms, as institutionalist perspectives underline (Verdun 2015; 
see Wolff and Ladi 2020). A critical juncture may also play out over a short-term horizon 
within or across sectoral or sub-sectoral policy cycles. Here the change may be less 
fundamental or transformative for the overarching institutional structure, but it still 
constitutes significant change within a particular policy field, as policy science perspec-
tives highlight (Howlett 2019, p. 423; Kingdon 2003). To qualify as a critical juncture, we 
suggest that such change in policy should show a shift in important pathways or direc-
tions of the policy field: away from previous path dependencies.
With these conceptual clarifications in mind, we analyse the potential or likelihood that 
the Covid-19 crisis represents a critical juncture for EU climate policy. We suggest, 
following also Wolff and Ladi (this issue), that different effects on EU climate policy may 
result from the Covid-19 crisis. Depending on the direction and scope of the effects, we can 
assess the likelihood that the Covid-19 crisis represents a critical juncture for EU climate 
policy.
We therefore seek to investigate whether the EU’s Covid-19 response has resulted in (1) 
no policy change or continuity (no effect, not a critical juncture); (2) backtracking or policy 
dismantling (negative effect, potentially a critical juncture); or (3) strengthening of pre-
vious policy trends (positive effect, potentially a critical juncture). A qualitative assessment 
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of the extent or scope of the effects is also necessary. Policy continuity implies no change 
in EU climate policy choices, pathways (planned policy proposals and their timing), 
decisions or ambition during or after the Covid-19 crisis. This finding would suggest 
that the crisis may not represent a critical juncture for EU climate policy, although given 
past experiences of stagnating climate policy in the wake of crises, continuity is still 
a noteworthy outcome (Gravey and Jordan 2019). For both negative and positive effects, 
there are different possible degrees of change. Backtracking or policy dismantling could 
involve decisions that water down EU climate policy ambition, weaken or delay imple-
mentation of adopted measures, or go as far as cancelling previous decisions and policies. 
A more fundamental effect, such as a policy cancellation, is likely to have farther reaching 
impacts for EU climate policy than watering down or weakening policy measures. 
Likewise, positive changes can vary in their extent. The development or implementation 
of existing policy plans and pathways could be hastened, new decisions on (future) policy 
pathways could be made or resource allocation could be increased. Depending on the 
speed or extent of strengthening, positive change could lead to transformative EU climate 
policy, implying a significant break from the previous policy development path towards 
swift changes across sectors to mitigate and adapt to climate change (leading to societal 
transformation) (Jacob and Ekins 2020; Saurugger and Terpan 2016; Stark 2018).
How can change be explained?
In addition to investigating the effects of the Covid-19 crisis on EU climate policy, we also 
explore two variables that may help us understand these effects, building on Wolff and 
Ladi (2020) and literature on policy change. In particular, we highlight the role of (institu-
tional) policy entrepreneurs and politicisation (and the interaction between them) to help 
us understand why the Covid-19 crisis may (not) represent a critical juncture for EU 
climate policy.
First, individuals or institutions acting as policy entrepreneurs can take advantage of 
a window of opportunity to frame and push a policy change (Hermansen 2015; Mintrom 
1997). A policy entrepreneur displays particular capabilities to take advantage of 
a window of opportunity to change the status quo. These include advocating new ideas 
or proposals, defining or reframing problems, building coalitions among policymakers 
and stakeholders, building on or mobilising public opinion and setting the agenda 
(Dunlop and Radaelli 2013; Kingdon 2003; Wolff and Ladi 2020). A policy entrepreneur 
displays political skill, knowledge and commitment to advancing change. Concerning the 
EU, while individuals within the EU institutions have sometimes been credited with 
entrepreneurial behaviour, many studies focus on the role of the Commission as an 
institutional policy entrepreneur based on its unique role in the EU system as an initiator 
of policy proposals (e.g. Laffan 1997; Skjærseth and Wettestad 2010; Boasson and 
Wettestad 2013). We also analyse the entrepreneurial role of the Commission to help 
explain policy dynamics in EU climate policy in the wake of the Covid-19 crisis. We look for 
evidence of entrepreneurial behaviour to advance policy change in documents, (joint) 
declarations, coalition-building, use and promotion of knowledge, and through declared 
commitment followed by proposals for action.
Second, we also examine the politicisation of both the issue of climate change and of 
climate policy responses in the EU as possibly driving policy change. As highlighted by 
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Wolff and Ladi (2020), we can understand politicisation to be an increase in the salience of 
an issue, which may contribute to policy change. An increased salience of the climate 
issue can be bottom-up, reflecting increasing concern among citizens and leading to 
societal and political mobilisation. Politicisation can also be a top-down change in political 
priorities, bringing policy issues into the realm of bargaining and conflictual high-level 
politics – the politicisation of policy, or ‘politics with policy’ as Schmidt has highlighted 
(2019). With politicisation, we may also find varying degrees of contestation and polarisa-
tion among EU institutions and actors, related to the perception of the problem itself or to 
proposed policy solutions (Dupont 2020; Herranz-Surrallés, Solorio, and Fairbrass 2020). 
To recognise politicisation (both top-down and bottom-up), we trace changes in prior-
itisation, agenda-setting, contestation and societal mobilisation towards both the issue of 
climate change and climate policy, and how these developments clashed or converged 
over time. This draws on evidence from literature and documents, as well as declarations 
and statements from policymakers or EU institutions.
However, politicisation and entrepreneurship also interact. Do they produce reinfor-
cing effects towards policy change or do they rather interact in neutral or even opposing 
ways? Given a potential critical juncture situation, a policy entrepreneur may be able to 
employ its skills to change the status quo to a significant extent. But the type and degree 
of politicisation of the issue at hand could hamper or facilitate an entrepreneur’s moves 
towards change. Politicisation effects play out over time, and whether a policy entrepre-
neur can take advantage of a window of opportunity to change the status quo may 
depend on how politicisation has developed. Therefore, we propose that the combination 
of a committed policy entrepreneur with a highly salient issue that had previously been 
politicised may drive critical junctures with transformational effects. We return to this 
proposition in the discussion.
The effect of Covid-19 on EU climate policy
To assess the Covid-19 crisis’ (potential) causal effect on EU climate policy, we need first to 
establish the state of EU climate policy before the pandemic. In this section, we discuss: (1) 
general, long-term trends in EU climate policy, (2) the pre-pandemic EU climate policy 
context, and (3) the integration of climate policy into the EU’s response to the Covid-19 
crisis.
Long-term trends in EU climate policy development
EU climate policy has developed in an incremental step-by-step process of improvement 
and expansion characterised by three main trends. First, the EU’s climate policy has been 
guided by successive targets to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions compared to 
1990 levels. After the EU adopted a target of stabilising CO2 emissions in the early 1990s 
towards the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), it committed 
to reducing GHG emissions by eight per cent over 2008–2012 under the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol to the UNFCCC. In 2007 and in 2014, the European Council adopted targets to 
reduce emissions by 20% by 2020 and by at least 40% by 2030, respectively. For 2020 and 
2030, these emission reduction targets were complemented with targets for the share of 
renewable energy in total energy consumption (20% by 2020 and 32% by 2030) and for 
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energy efficiency improvements (20% for 2020 and 32.5% for 2030). Whereas the emission 
reduction targets for 2020 and 2030 are legally binding, of the remaining targets, only the 
renewables target for 2020 is binding on member states. The targets have provided clear 
guidance for policymakers and stakeholders and they have served to underpin the EU’s 
international leadership aspirations (Oberthür and Pallemaerts 2010; Oberthür and Roche 
Kelly 2008).
Second, early choices of climate policy instruments have set the direction. After 
some initial climate policy developments in the 1990s, emission reduction targets have 
especially been implemented through the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS – for the 
power and industry sectors), first adopted in 2003, and through a distribution of the 
emission reduction targets for non-ETS sectors (transport, buildings, agriculture) 
among member states (‘effort sharing’). The ETS has been considered the centrepiece 
of EU climate policy ever since and it has been repeatedly amended to enhance its 
effectiveness (Skjærseth and Wettestad 2010). The complementary targets on renew-
able energy and energy efficiency have been implemented through the Renewable 
Energy Directive and the Energy Efficiency Directive and related revisions. However, 
the fundamental overall design of the policy framework has been retained (Kulovesi 
and Oberthür 2020).
Third, new elements have been added to the EU’s climate policy framework in a step- 
by-step expansion over time. The directives on renewable energy and energy efficiency 
were such complements. In addition, the EU has, within the overall framework created by 
the key instruments mentioned above, implemented an increasingly comprehensive 
acquis of climate legislation, including further instruments on energy efficiency/consump-
tion (e.g. energy performance of buildings; energy labelling; ecodesign; CO2 standards for 
cars, vans and heavy-duty vehicles), fluorinated GHGs and more. The 2030 climate and 
energy policy framework also added measures on Land-Use, Land-Use Change and 
Forestry (LULUCF) and set a new governance framework (reporting, planning, review) 
for climate and energy policy. Altogether, these elements have complemented and 
developed the basic architecture of EU climate governance, rather than changing it 
fundamentally (Kulovesi and Oberthür 2020).
The European Green Deal
Officially launched in December 2019, the EGD built on, but also moved far beyond, 
previous policy developments. In the years before, more voices emphasised the systemic/ 
societal challenge of transitioning to sustainability. In November 2018, the Commission – 
building on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report on the 
impacts of global warming of 1.5° Celsius (IPCC 2018) – published a communication 
calling for the EU to pursue climate neutrality for 2050 (European Commission 2018). In 
2019, then Commission President-designate Ursula von der Leyen made the EGD, includ-
ing the goal of Europe becoming the first ‘climate neutral continent’, a key plank of her 
election campaign (Von der Leyen 2019). In November, the European Parliament declared 
a climate emergency (European Parliament 2019). In December 2019, the European 
Council endorsed the 2050 goal of climate neutrality, with the exception of Poland 
(European Council 2019).
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The EGD is an evolving policy programme and strategy with a significant potential to 
make EU climate policy transformational. While it addresses a broader set of environ-
mental and sustainability issues, the climate transition is at its core. Several elements 
underpin its transformational potential. First, the EGD pursues the goal for the EU to 
become climate neutral by 2050 and consequently foresees an upgrade of the EU’s 2030 
GHG emission reduction target from 40% to at least 50–55%. Second, it puts climate 
neutrality at the heart of EU policies in general, stating that ‘all EU actions and policies will 
have to contribute to the European Green Deal objectives’ (European Commission 
2019, 3) and ‘live up to a green oath to “do no harm”’ (ibid., p. 19). Third, it embraces 
social justice as a key principle by calling for the climate transition to be just and inclusive 
and to ‘leave no one behind’, with the help of a Just Transition Mechanism, including 
a Just Transition Fund (ibid., p. 16). Finally, the EGD aims to raise additional investments of 
EUR 260 billion required per year, including through a Sustainable Europe Investment 
Plan (ibid., 15–17). It also includes a focus on the transformational challenges in hard-to- 
abate sectors, including industry, buildings and transport/mobility.
While the EGD provides a basis for redirecting EU climate policy towards transforma-
tional change, the test remains in its implementation (Bloomfield and Steward 2020). To 
this end, the EGD envisaged nearly 50 legislative and policy initiatives. Some of these were 
published in 2020, including proposals for a Just Transition Mechanism and a Sustainable 
Europe Investment Plan in January 2020, and a proposal for a Climate Law to enshrine the 
2050 climate neutrality goal and an EU industrial strategy in March 2020 (European 
Commission 2019, Annex). In September 2020, the Commission proposed increasing 
the 2030 emission reduction target to at least 55% through the proposed Climate Law 
(European Commission 2020d). The European Parliament advocated a further strengthen-
ing to 60%. At the time of writing, a decision on the 2030 goal in Council is pending, with 
many member states supporting a target of at least 55% reductions by 2030. The Council 
has pushed the discussion on the 2030 target to the European Council meeting in 
December 2020 (Council of the European Union 2020).
EU climate policy and the response to Covid-19
We may expect to see effects of the Covid-19 crisis on EU climate policy development 
especially with respect to two policy agendas: (1) the further implementation of the EGD 
and (2) the design of the economic recovery from the crisis. We focus on these two 
aspects in the following.
The early days of the Covid-19 crisis saw an attack on EU climate policy by several 
member states and some businesses, which was countered by others. For example, Czech 
Prime Minister Babis in March 2020 called for abandoning the EGD, while voices in Poland 
suggested that the EU ETS might best be suspended (Elkerbout et al. 2020). The European 
Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA) called for an adjustment of the timing of 
EU regulations, such as CO2 vehicle standards. And BusinessEurope in April 2020 
requested a delay in the further consideration of key climate and environment initiatives 
(see Lazarus 2020). In contrast, 17 EU environment ministers came together in March and 
April 2020 to call for making the EGD central to all post-pandemic recovery planning.1 
NGOs, interested businesses and many decision-makers also countered the attacks 
launched and, supported by international organisations such as the International 
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Energy Agency, argued that the needed economic recovery programmes constituted 
a unique opportunity to advance the climate transition and to exploit its economic 
potential (Colli 2020; Lazarus 2020).
First, on the implementation of the EGD, the Commission forged ahead roughly as it 
had planned, although with some inescapable delays. It had published several initiatives 
in early 2020 before the crisis had fully unfolded, including proposals for a Just 
Transition Mechanism, the European Climate Law, an industrial strategy and an invest-
ment plan (European Commission 2020b; see above). Affected by the disruptions of the 
crisis, the Commission then delayed the publication of some other elements of the EGD, 
such as the ‘Farm to Fork’ agricultural strategy. However, it was quick to reconfirm its 
commitment to the EGD and its climate components, including the proposed Climate 
Law, and plans to upgrade the EU’s 2030 GHG emission target to at least 55% and the 
preparation of subsequent legislative proposals (Krukowska 2020). In so doing, it was 
supported by the European Parliament that, in April 2020, called for the EGD to be at 
the core of the EU’s crisis response (European Parliament 2020) and asked the 
Commission to stick to its EGD plans.2 The European Council also expressed its support 
for advancing the green transition through the EU’s crisis response at the end of 
March 2020.3
Second, the EU’s response to the social and economic consequences of the Covid-19 
crisis has put a strong emphasis on the sustainability and climate transition. The 
Commission published its proposals for a NextGenEU recovery instrument on 
27 May 2020 (European Commission 2020a) along with an overarching vision of the 
EU’s budget for 2021–27 (the MFF) (European Commission 2020c), thereby adapting its 
original MFF proposal of 2018 to the changed circumstances. The European Council 
reached an agreement on both the recovery instrument and the MFF in July 2020, 
which provided the basis for ongoing negotiations with the European Parliament. The 
words ‘resilience/resilient’, ‘green’, ‘sustainability/sustainable’ and ‘climate’ together 
appear 67 and 75 times, respectively, in the two Commission documents (European 
Commission 2020a, 2020c). They also feature 72 times in the relevant European Council 
conclusions (European Council 2020).
More substantively, the emerging recovery response (both NextGenEU and the MFF), 
on balance, seems to advance and strengthen the implementation of the EGD. Whereas 
the MFF for 2014–2020 aimed at a share of climate expenditure of 20% and the 
Commission had proposed that this share should be increased to 25%, the European 
Council agreed to further raise this figure to 30%. Taking into account the much-increased 
overall funding (from about EUR 1 trillion in the original MFF proposal to more than EUR 
1.8 trillion with the recovery fund), this represents a significant boost in funding the 
climate transition and in filling the related investment gap (Claeys and Tagliapietra 2020). 
Furthermore, the European Council agreed on a EUR 17.5 billion Just Transition Fund – 
lower than the EUR 40 billion suggested by the Commission in May 2020, but significantly 
up from the resource endowment of EUR 10 billion under the original MFF proposal. In 
addition, expenditures are to contribute to the green and digital transition and should be 
consistent with the Paris Agreement objectives and the ‘do no harm’ principle of the EGD 
(European Council 2020, paras. A19, A21 and 18). At the time of writing (November 2020), 
negotiations with the Parliament, which has called for increased financing for the climate 
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component, have reached provisional agreement, although challenges to final agreement 
among member states remain.
Covid-19 as a critical juncture for EU climate policy?
Given that EU climate policy developed in incremental steps from the 1990s, by 
ratcheting up targets, amending previous policies, and adding measures step-by-step, 
the adoption of the EGD by the Commission can be seen as a shift towards a more 
transformational EU climate policy, at least on paper. It could be seen as a turning point 
in EU climate policy towards an integrative, systemic, and boundary-setting framework 
for all EU policies and actions, with the climate neutrality goal at its heart. 
Consequently, the adoption of the EGD could already represent a critical juncture for 
EU climate policy.
The Covid-19 crisis, and the unprecedented recovery plan, could then be seen as 
reinforcing or strengthening the EGD as an earlier potential critical juncture in EU 
climate policy. The recovery plan does not propose new instruments or innovations 
beyond the EGD or change policy direction (evidence of continuity). There is also no 
evidence that it will lead to backtracking or policy dismantling, beyond some initial 
delays because of the Covid-19 emergency (i.e. no evidence of negative effects). 
Rather, it reinforces major elements of the EGD, in particular regarding the invest-
ments required (evidence of positive effects). In sum, there is evidence of 
a strengthening of policy development and implementation, but continuity with 
regard to overall aims, direction and instruments. Therefore, we can see potential for 
the Covid-19 crisis to effect positive – but perhaps not transformational – change on 
EU climate policy.
Having said that, the eventual effect of the Covid-19 crisis on EU climate policy will not 
least depend on the actual implementation of the EGD and the EU’s crisis response. At the 
time of writing, the Parliament’s demands for more climate ambition in the MFF make 
a negative effect of the recovery plan on EU climate policy unlikely. Subsequently, the 
consistency of spending with the Paris Agreement and the EGD will need to be fully 
ensured, and all 30% of climate spending will need to serve effectively the climate 
transition (see European Court of Auditors 2020). For its part, most of the EGD still awaits 
implementation, and challenges to implementation may still arise from other corners 
rather than as a direct result of the Covid-19 crisis. Since a critical juncture is an event in 
the past that has causal effects in the future, some temporal distance will be required for 
a definite assessment. Nevertheless, the EU’s crisis response has enhanced rather than 
diminished prospects for the implementation of the EGD.
Understanding Covid-19 effects on EU climate policy
While only time can tell whether the EU’s Covid-19 recovery plan and the EGD represent 
critical junctures for EU climate policy, the EU’s crisis response has already shown positive 
effects. We here reflect on why. Previous economic crises led to downgrading or side- 
lining EU environmental or climate policy (negative effects) (Gravey and Jordan 2019; 
Lenschow, Burns, and Zito 2020). The positive effects may thus be puzzling. We turn our 
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attention to Commission entrepreneurship and to politicisation to help us understand the 
turn of events.
The Commission as a policy entrepreneur
The incremental advancement of EU climate policy until 2019 was spurred with help from 
policy entrepreneurs, in particular the Commission (Boasson and Wettestad 2013). During 
the Covid-19 crisis, the Commission used its agenda-setting power and its coalition- 
building power by building on its expertise and the networks of Member State represen-
tatives and stakeholders not only to prepare and table legislative proposals, such as the 
Climate Law and to continue to implement the EGD, but also to exploit the ‘window of 
opportunity’ created by the Covid-19 crisis to help make the EGD a central pillar of the 
crisis response.
The Covid-19 crisis allowed the Commission to exercise its entrepreneurial capabilities 
to advance EU climate policy in at least two ways. First, the Commission used the EU’s 
response to Covid-19 to reinforce the EGD.4 Building on the EGD and integrating it into 
the broader discussion on the Covid-19 crisis response, the Commission used its climate 
policy expertise and demonstrated its commitment to climate neutrality, thereby also 
rebutting early contestations to a green recovery (see above). In general, the crisis led to 
increased support for a stronger role of public policy, including spending, and shifted 
attention towards frames and issues which are more closely associated with support for 
climate action (Mulders 2020; Tooze 2020). For example, the importance of knowledge 
and the role of science for policymaking were (re)emphasised (Van Dooren and 
Noordegraaf 2020). This was manifested in Commission statements on the connections 
between environmental degradation and health, which provide for a knowledge-based 
justification of environmental and climate action at the centre of the response to the 
pandemic (European Commission 2020a). This contrasts starkly with the response to the 
2008/2009 crisis, when conditions tended to undermine climate action (Gravey and 
Jordan 2019).
Second, the Covid-19 crisis and its differential impact among Member States led to 
calls, in particular by the worst affected Member States, for unprecedented, additional and 
large EU funds to support the recovery.5 The Commission responded quickly to these calls 
and used its agenda-setting power to integrate climate concerns into the recovery fund 
and the MFF, placing the climate neutrality goal and the transition to sustainability at the 
core. The Commission successfully encouraged and drew upon the mobilisation of 
a growing and wide coalition of actors pushing for a green recovery plan (including 
a coalition of member state environment ministers, see above). The ensuing negotiations 
in the European Council resulted in the requirement to spend 30% of the recovery funds 
and the broader MFF on achieving climate goals as well as an increase in just transition 
funding, so that overall EU funding on climate related measures increased considerably 
compared to pre-crisis plans.
As an agenda-setter and in drafting proposals, the Commission skilfully acted as an 
entrepreneur shaping the EU’s response to the Covid-19 crisis. It joined forces with 
stakeholders and policymakers to rebut early calls to side-line climate action, pushed 
for a green recovery in the EU, drew on expertise and knowledge to justify its proposals, 
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and grasped the window of opportunity of the EU recovery fund to advance the EGD 
goals.
The Commission’s policy entrepreneurship contrasts with past experiences with EU 
crisis response. When the Commission acted as a policy entrepreneur after the 2008 
economic crisis to support EU climate policy, it had to resort to initiatives which remained 
‘under the radar’ and had no immediate budgetary or economic implications (Rietig and 
Perkins 2018). Being a skilled policy entrepreneur, therefore, seems an insufficient expla-
nation for the advances in EU climate policy in the Covid-19 response. We next investigate 
whether politicisation can provide some further understanding.
The role of politicisation
When examining the role of politicisation in whether the Covid-19 crisis is likely to 
constitute a critical juncture for EU climate policy, we discuss, first, how the salience of 
climate change and climate policy has increased over time, and second, how politicisation 
events in 2019/2020 served to reduce contestation to climate policy during the Covid-19 
crisis.
First, and as discussed above, climate change moved over time from a technical policy 
issue in the 1990s, to one of concern for the highest levels of government. Its salience 
increased until it became firmly established as part of high politics. Top-down or high- 
level politicisation of climate change in the EU has long been linked to the EU’s interna-
tional leadership ambitions (Oberthür and Roche Kelly 2008). With such politicisation, 
however, contestation increased – in the EU most often focused on the scope and 
stringency of climate policies rather than the issue of the existence of man-made climate 
change itself (Herranz-Surrallés, Solorio, and Fairbrass 2020). The salience of the climate 
issue was further bolstered with refined scientific understanding and advice (e.g. IPCC 
2018), which also increased bottom-up politicisation through public opinion and social 
movements. By 2018, both bottom-up and top-down politicisation of climate change and 
climate policy had grown to outweigh contestation, facilitating the adoption of new 
climate targets and policies (e.g. for 2030) (Kulovesi and Oberthür 2020).
Second, two further politicisation events in 2019 set the stage for the EGD to be central 
to the EU’s Covid-19 response. First, intense protests, such as the Fridays for Future 
movements, demonstrated public support across Europe (and beyond) for climate action, 
and increased bottom-up pressure on policymakers. Second, electoral gains for Green 
parties in national and European elections meant that climate change was further 
prioritised across several national governments and in the European Parliament. By 
mid-2019, there was broad political momentum within the EU, with the Commission, 
the Parliament and many member states governments aligned in considering combating 
climate change a high priority.
The broad momentum and convergence of bottom-up and top-down politicisation in 
the EU was followed by the Parliament’s declaration of a climate emergency in 
November 2019, the launch of the EGD in December 2019 and the joint declaration of 
17 member states’ environment ministers in 2020 calling for a green response to the 
Covid-19 crisis (see above). In 2019, in her bid to gain the Commission Presidency, Ursula 
von der Leyen committed strongly before the Parliament to making the EGD the 
Commission’s signature policy, also presenting the EGD as the EU’s new growth strategy. 
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This commitment was reflected in the composition and division of competences of the 
new Commission, with Frans Timmermans appointed as Executive Vice-President respon-
sible for overseeing EGD implementation. The Commission thus staked its political cred-
ibility on the EGD, which provided significant motivation to ensure it remained central in 
the recovery plan. The growing politicisation, and ensuing support and commitment from 
EU institutions and member states for strong climate action, increased the capacity to 
counter contestation from certain member states and business interests so that the EGD 
could become a central part of the EU’s Covid-19 recovery (see also above).
Interactions between factors
As neither Commission entrepreneurship nor politicisation of climate change are entirely 
new phenomena (Lenschow, Burns, and Zito 2020; Oberthür and Roche Kelly 2008), it 
remains puzzling why the Covid-19 crisis has not, like previous crises, resulted in climate 
policy being side-lined. We discuss here the interactions between entrepreneurialism and 
politicisation to help shed further light.
Entrepreneurialism and politicisation have reinforced each other to achieve the inte-
gration of the EGD into the EU’s Covid-19 response. Above, we outlined how the 
Commission successfully deployed its entrepreneurial skills, both to rebut early contesta-
tion, and to propose a recovery plan for the EU with the EGD as a central element. 
However, the Commission’s success as a policy entrepreneur during the Covid-19 crisis 
was crucially supported by the much increased level of politicisation of climate policy, 
which the Commission was able to exploit alongside its usual entrepreneurial resources. 
By the time the Commission proposed the EGD in 2019, climate change had become an 
entrenched and high-level priority for governments, the public and EU institutions. It was 
this convergence of broad politicisation with Commission entrepreneurship that prepared 
the ground for the window of opportunity opened by the Covid-19 crisis to be exploited 
for EU climate policy.
The interaction of politicisation and entrepreneurialism seems to have been sufficient 
to advance and strengthen the previously adopted policy pathway (the EGD). However, as 
mentioned above, realisation of the full potential of the Covid-19 crisis to represent 
a critical juncture for EU climate policy remains to be seen as the response is finalised 
and implementation unfolds. As with the EGD – an earlier potential critical juncture that 
could have a transformational effect on EU climate policy – only time will tell. Therefore, 
while conditions seem favourable, further analysis will still be required to disentangle 
whether politicisation and deployed entrepreneurial capabilities provide sufficient 
explanation.
Conclusions
In this article, we investigated whether it is likely that the Covid-19 crisis represents 
a critical juncture for EU climate policy and, if so, why. Given the nature of a critical 
juncture as an event or phenomenon that moves policy or institutional development onto 
a new path, we face challenges in responding with certainty as we are analysing recent 
and unfolding events. However, by investigating long-term trends in EU climate policy, 
the status of EU climate policy before the Covid-19 crisis, and the place of climate policy in 
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the EU’s response to Covid-19, we were able to assess whether and to what extent the 
Covid-19 crisis represents a potential critical juncture.
We find that the Covid-19 crisis has resulted in positive effects on EU climate policy, 
especially by strengthening and advancing previous policy trends. While positive change 
is evident, a question remains about whether the Covid-19 crisis itself can be considered 
a critical juncture leading to a new path for EU climate policy. Our analysis shows that the 
EGD may yet prove to be more transformational and may itself represent a critical 
juncture leading to far-reaching change in EU climate policy, that the Covid-19 crisis 
then reinforced and advanced. While the status of the Covid-19 crisis or the EGD as critical 
junctures for EU climate policy will not least depend on implementation, these results 
contrast starkly with previous research on EU responses to crises, and particularly the 
2008/2009 economic crisis, that shows that environmental and climate policies were 
rather side-lined, leading to stagnation and delays in policy development and implemen-
tation (Gravey and Jordan 2019; Lenschow, Burns, and Zito 2020).
We furthermore find that Commission policy entrepreneurship and politicisation have 
interacted to drive the positive effect of the Covid-19 crisis on EU climate policy. Based on its 
entrepreneurial capabilities and skills, the Commission holds an important agenda-setting 
role, draws on knowledge and expertise, can mobilise networks across member states and 
institutions, and has the capacity and skills to frame, reframe and push issues. The 
Commission’s entrepreneurship unfolded against the backdrop of the long-term politicisation 
of climate change and climate policy in the EU. The increased salience of the climate issue 
resulted in firm embeddedness in the high-politics agenda, leading naturally to heightened 
contestation of climate policy. Over time, broad top-down and bottom-up politicisation made 
responding to climate change a priority across levels and institutions. Such politicisation 
meant that by 2019, when the EGD was launched, contestation could be more easily fended 
off. While the Commission has not always used its entrepreneurial capacity to advance climate 
policy (Knill, Steinebech, and Fernández-i-Marín 2020), the contemporary politicisation of 
climate change and climate policy in the EU provided a strong driver for it to deploy its 
entrepreneurial skills to propose the EGD in 2019 and to maintain it as a central aspect of the 
EU’s Covid-19 response. Taken together, the Commission’s entrepreneurship and the strong 
politicisation allowed for the window of opportunity opened by the Covid-19 crisis to be 
exploited to ensure the EGD, and climate policy, were advanced and strengthened in the EU’s 
response, rather than side-lined, as had occurred in the past.
Our article contributes to literature on policy change, critical junctures and EU climate 
policy by engaging in an exploratory analysis of ongoing events and by considering how 
to recognise a potential critical juncture. We need to await implementation of both the 
EGD and the EU’s Covid-19 recovery plan to establish conclusively whether the effects of 
the Covid-19 crisis, together with the EGD, pushed towards a (transformational) critical 
juncture for EU climate policy. With that, further analysis will be required to understand 
the explanatory roles of entrepreneurialism, politicisation and other potential factors. 
History teaches us, however, that such favourable conditions for EU climate policy should 
not be greeted with complacency. Research has outlined the many ways in which policies 
may be weakened or made ineffective (see e.g. Burns and Tobin 2020). Intergenerational 
cleavages in impacts of, and responses to, both climate change and the Covid-19 crisis 
may also become more acute, leading to new types and venues of contestation. 
Understanding the conditions for advancing EU climate policy in changing contexts and 
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in times of crisis (including Europe’s second wave of Covid-19 in late 2020) remains 
critically important to ensure that EU climate policy can achieve climate neutrality by 
2050 at the latest.
Notes
1. See: https://www.climatechangenews.com/2020/04/09/european-green-deal-must-central- 
resilient-recovery-covid-19/, accessed: 8 May 2020.
2. See https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20200419IPR77407/eu-covid-19- 
recovery-plan-must-be-green-and-ambitious-say-meps, accessed: 10 September 2020.
3. See https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/eu-leaders-back-green- 
transition-in-pandemic-recovery-plan/, accessed: 10 September 2020.
4. See, for example, https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/timmer 
mans-promises-green-recovery-to-eu-lawmakers/, accessed: 10 September 2020.
5. See https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/eu-leaders-agree-plans-for- 
unprecedented-stimulus-against-pandemic/, accessed: 10 September 2020.
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